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Abstract 
The potential supply of water quality mitigation actions from diffuse sources is difficult 
to assess, although important for designing policies to encourage such actions.  In this 
paper the design and results of a Choice Modelling(CM) valuation to assess the potential 
supply of rural mitigation actions from altered grazing management are reported.  The 
valuation was focused on the supply of mitigating services (specified riparian 
management standards), the total cost of provision, and the extent to which these costs 
varied between landholders.  CM has traditionally been applied to environmental 
valuation issues, but there is increasing use of the method to design agricultural markets. 
This study extends that application to markets for environmental actions. 
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1.  Introduction  
Concern about the adverse environmental impacts of some land management practices on 
water quality in our river systems has resulted in both state and commonwealth funding 
for the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality.  In Queensland, these 
concerns are further exacerbated in the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) catchment area 
(Productivity Commission 2003; Science Panel 2003).   
 
The government has used a mixture of regulatory and persuasive measures to try and 
reduced the impacts of land use activities on water quality. Considerable effort has been 
placed in voluntary schemes such as Landcare, but there is a widely held belief that 
voluntary measures alone will not be able to achieve the outcomes required to avoid the 
escalating costs of environmental damage.  The Landcare style of changes in land 
management practices tend to involve both private benefits in terms of production gains 
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to the landholder as well as public benefits to society in terms of environmental gains, eg,  
weed control.  However, the opportunity for further major gains in these areas appear 
limited. 
 
The other key area of interest is land management changes that would bring public 
benefits, but involve a private cost to landholders.  There has been a tendency in policy 
terms to view such tradeoffs as multi-party externality problems that are best solved 
through regulatory mechanisms.  However, the externality paradigm is not always 
appropriate when there have been prior allocations of property rights, whether formal or 
informal (Anderson 2004).  As well, regulatory intervention is not always very efficient, 
especially when there are potentially very large compliance, monitoring and enforcement 
costs. 
 
In many of these areas, persuasive measures have been used to try and encourage 
landholders to “do the right thing”, and reduce the environmental impact of their 
management actions. However, declining terms of trade in agriculture and adverse 
weather conditions have meant that many farmers cannot afford further production losses. 
There is a growing recognition that landholders might incur private costs by changing 
management practices to achieve environmental gains, and in order to achieve the desired 
environmental outcomes, landholders will need to be compensated for these incurred 
costs.   
 
This recognition marks a shift in attitude to public and private property rights.  If 
landholders are to be compensated for their private costs of making management changes, 
it implies they have  some property rights over natural resource management.  The 
implication of many regulatory interventions is that the public has the right not to be 
polluted.  While regulation remains an important tool in some areas, it is not an 
appropriate or efficient mechanism to use for many natural resource issues.  In areas 
where landholders hold property rights over land management issues, a more appropriate 
paradigm might be a form of negotiation over the balance between private and public 
outcomes. 
 
A new range of policy tools, known as market-based instruments, are currently being 
developed to try and achieve environmental outcomes more efficiently and in the most 
cost effective way for society.  The research outlined in this paper is being conducted as 
one of the pilot projects in the National Market-Based Instruments Pilots Program funded 
under the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality.  The main aim of the 
project is to examine the potential for quantity-based water quality outcomes in the 
Fitzroy Basin in central Queensland.  These may be summarized as cap-and-trade 
mechanisms, offset trading and bubble schemes (O’Dea and Rolfe 2005).  An overview 
of the environmental issues in the basin and opportunities for offset trading are outlined 
in Rolfe et al. 2004a. 
 
The Fitzroy Basin is the second largest catchment in Australia and the largest of the 
catchments draining into the GBR.  In terms of area, rangeland grazing is the principal 
land use and covers 87.5% of the basin area (Jones et al. 2000), with 94% of the area 
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used for agriculture (Furnas 2003).  As it occupies such a large area in the basin, it is the 
land use which has the most impact on water quality. Sedimentation is the main 
environmental issue, with nitrogen and phosphorus loads also of concern..  Sediment 
comes from diffuse sources and in the Fitzroy River, with 63% of the sediment transport 
from hill slope erosion, 25% from gully erosion and13% is from stream bank erosion 
(NLWA 2003).   
 
The focus of the research reported in this paper is on the minimization of diffuse source 
impacts from agriculture.  A choice exists between two broad mechanisms for minimising 
water quality impacts from agriculture: riparian protection and improved ground cover.  
While improved ground cover would minimize most problems at the source, it is more 
difficult to implement as a policy option because of the heterogeneous landscape and 
difficulties in assessment and monitoring.  The importance of riparian vegetation in 
improving water quality is outlined in Rolfe et al. 2004b, with riparian management 
selected as the primary mitigating strategy of focus in the project.  While riparian buffers 
are essentially input controls designed to improve water quality rather than more 
desirable output measures, the lack of relevant scientific data and monitoring capability 
means that a focus on output measures (i.e. changed water quality off farms) is not 
practical.  The establishment of riparian buffers has thus been selected as the appropriate 
mechanism for the study.   
 
This paper focuses on the design of a Choice Modelling (CM) valuation exercise to 
determine the potential supply of riparian buffer rehabilitation by landholders in the 
Fitzroy Basin, in order to provide essential information to assist in the evaluation and 
design of a MBI to achieve water quality outcomes in the catchment. The technique has 
traditionally been applied to environmental valuation issues, but there is increasing use of 
CM to design agricultural markets (Lusk and Hudson 2004).  This study extends that 
application to markets for environmental actions. It investigates landholders’ preference 
heterogeneity in willingness-to-accept direct monetary incentives for the 
rehabilitation/restoration of riparian buffers. By predicting a supply function for riparian 
vegetation, the design of incentive structure can then be addressed.  The demand for 
water quality improvements in the Fitzroy Basin has been assessed in a series of CM 
valuations (eg Rolfe et al. 2002; Rolfe and Bennet 2003; Windle and Rolfe 2002; 2004) 
and is synthesised in Rolfe et al. (2004b). 
 
The design of a CM study is complex because of the number of relationships and factors 
that have to be modeled, and important because of the need to avoid biases and 
communicate choice tasks to respondents.  In this paper, the main design issues and 
results of the CM valuation are reported.  The remainder of this paper is set as follows.  
In the next section details are presented of the main design issues that distinguished this 
CM application (to examine management actions to provide environmental services) 
from the more standard application (to examine the values associated with environmental 
services).  Details of the CM survey and the collection technique applied are presented in 
Section 3.  The results are presented in the fourth section and discussed and summarized 
in the final section. 
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2.  The Choice Modelling valuation – key design issues  
Understanding the potential supply of riparian buffers by landholders is an important 
factor in modeling the application of different market based instruments.  It might be 
possible, although difficult, to implement a minimum level of riparian buffer to be 
established, and then allow trade in the requirements between landholders.  This would be 
a form of cap-and-trade mechanism.  However the ‘cap’ would be difficult to implement 
given that it would be at odds with some landholder property rights over riparian 
management, especially for lower order streams. 
 
A more realistic mechanism to introduce might be forms of offset trading, where 
landholders might supply intervention strategies to offset potential reductions from 
industry, urban or mining sources.  To understand the potential for an offset market to 
operate, it is important to be able to model the supply of riparian buffers.  The supply of 
riparian buffers might also be suited to government funded programs.  In this situation, 
competitive tender mechanisms may be used to ensure efficient allocation of public 
funds.  These are likely to hold some advantages over current systems of devolved grants 
used to achieve similar outcomes.  Again, the estimation of a potential supply function 
for riparian buffers may be important to judge the likely takeup and gains available from 
this form of a market based incentive. 
 
The research problem was to design an application of the CM technique to estimate the 
potential supply of riparian buffers.  CM is typically used to estimate demands for a 
change in the provision of environmental factors, so this represented a very different 
application of the technique.  There were four key design issues that needed to be 
addressed in the developing the CM exercise, which distinguish this CM application from 
the more common application to value non-market environmental goods.  These are 
outlined in turn. 
 
 
2.1  The policy context and implications 
In a CM application a hypothetical market is created, but it must be framed in a realistic 
and believable policy context.  One focus of the research project was on the use of a cap 
and trade policy mechanism, but this would have been an unrealistic policy context for 
agricultural producers.  To impose the cap, a hypothetical regulation would need to be 
described to landholders, which would be unrealistic and likely to provoke an adverse 
reaction.  Instead, the policy context was framed in terms of a competitive tender.  
 
The competitive tender context framed the choice scenario in terms of the amount of 
money that landholders would be prepared to accept in order to provide a certain level of 
riparian buffer on their property.  This was realistic as property rights were implicitly 
assigned to graziers and they would be paid for services provided. It was believable, as 
some landholders already received devolved grants to assist in the cost of fencing off 
riparian areas.  It also provided the right incentives for graziers to participate in the 
survey.   
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One implication of using a competitive tender policy context was that a willingness-to-
accept (WTA) format would need to be used.  The disparity between willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) and WTA is well documented in the literature and substantial effort has been 
applied at both a theoretical and experimental level to explain the differences (Mitchell 
and Carson 1989, Hanemann 1991, Horowitz and McConnell 2002).  Given the potential 
for strategic behaviour in a WTA payment format, consideration was given to the 
selection of choice attributes and the benefits of including at least one attribute described 
in qualitative terms.   
 
The key issue with the WTP format is that respondents who were risk adverse or had 
little understanding of the tradeoffs may only respond to very high monetary incentives.  
To the extent that their response may be different in a real-world application where they 
had more time to consider and analyse their choices, the results of the CM exercise may 
understate the potential supply at various price levels. 
 
 
2.2  Choice attributes  
In a CM application, the choice scenario is described and presented to respondents in 
terms of different attributes.  While many attributes seemed to be relevant to this case 
study, it was important to limit the number to four or five at the most so that tradeoffs 
were comprehensible to respondents.  Initially consideration was given to a range of 
attributes that were explored in a focus group.   
 
The potential attributes could be defined in two broad groups.  The first were attributes 
that described the types of riparian buffers available.  The types of attributes considered 
were: 
 The potential width of a buffer zone, 
 The stream order involved in a riparian buffer, 
 The level of environmental service provided (i.e. the proportion of cattle 
exclusion), 
 The length of the zone on each property (or the proportion of riparian length 
covered), 
 The amount of fencing and water replacement that might be needed, and 
 The level of landholder management required (i.e. weed control). 
 
The second were attributes that defined the contract details.  Here the key attributes that 
were considered included: 
 The length of the contract period, 
 The payment allocation over that period, 
 The type of contracting body involved,  
 The type of contract (i.e. a covenant over the land versus some form of contract), 
 The type of monitoring and enforcement mechanism. 
 
To reduce the number of attributes, the analysis was simplified in several ways.  First, a 
number of key baseline conditions were set (outlined in Section 3 below) so that these did 
 5
not have to be presented as key attributes.  Second, some additional information relevant 
to each choice made was collected in the survey.  As well, other information was 
gathered by asking a separate question in the survey.  Four attributes were finally used in 
the choice sets (see Table 2 in Section 3 below) which made the choice selection 
relatively straight forward. One attribute was described in qualitative terms and one 
attribute had a mixture of quantitative and qualitative levels.  
 
2.3  Measurement issues 
 
Table 1.  Summary of measurement issues. 
Issue Considerations  Information to collect 
River and 
Creek order 
 Costs of riparian management 
vary with the size of the river. 
 There maybe more than one 
river and different river orders 
on a property. 
 Focus on river order 3 and 
higher. 
 Focus on the highest river order 
on the property. 
 Identifying which river on the 
property is being considered was 
determined and agreed with the 
respondent beforehand. 
Control and 
management 
of riparian 
land 
 Give and take boundary 
agreements are common in 
Qld. Where boundaries run 
down the middle of a river, 
part of the river may be 
fenced into one property 
(give) and another part into 
into the adjoining property 
(take). 
 Rivers within a property will 
have two river bank riparian 
areas to manage  
 Details of the length of river 
under the landholder control was 
separated into 3 categories.  
o River on the boundary 
edge  
o Give and take boundary 
o River within the property  
 
Landholders were asked in the 
survey to identify which of these 
applied to their situation. 
Riparian 
areas 
covered by 
devolved 
grants 
 Some landholders have 
already received devolved 
grants to assist with fencing 
costs.  
 Landholders were asked to 
identify the river frontage areas 
that have been fenced under a 
devolved grant.  These areas 
were to be excluded from the 
subsequent choice set questions.. 
Opportunity 
costs  
 Buffer width will affect the 
opportunity cost, but will vary 
across locations because of 
different flood damage risk 
 Need to distinguish between 
opportunity cost and capital 
infrastructure costs so that 
bids could be compared. 
 A separate question was used to 
establish the average width of 
river area under their control. 
 The capital costs associated with 
a WTA payment option were 
identified with a separate 
question on each choice set. 
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Using CM to provide information for assist in the design of an MBI meant that a variety 
of measurement issues needed to be addressed that would not arise in a CM 
environmental valuation.  These are summarized in Table 1.   
 
The amount of variability in the case study being considered made it very difficult to 
design appropriate choice sets.  While the contract design issues and necessary 
management actions could largely be addressed by specifying set levels that applied to all 
the choice sets, the riparian buffer characteristics were more complicated to address.  
Some of the key issues that made it difficult to design choice sets that were applicable to 
all landholders were: 
 
(a) Stream order:  Stream order is important in predicting environmental benefits, but 
ranged from 1 (small watercourse) to 6 (major river) in the case study of interest.  Most 
properties include more than one stream order, and it is unlikely that the opportunity costs 
are equivalent.  This was addressed by asking for buffers on the highest stream order 
only, and identifying the stream order for each respondent. 
 
(b) Buffer width:  It was not practical to set a standard width for buffers because some 
floodplains are very wide compared to others, and many are already fenced at varying 
widths.  This was addressed by setting only minimum widths for buffers, and not 
insisting that buffers be fenced.  
 
(c) Cost structure:  For some landholders, their willingness to accept would be 
determined not only by their opportunity costs, but by capital costs required as well.  The 
latter would be involved when fencing was required for buffer zones, or when off-stream 
watering points were needed.  Not all landholders would be affected, and the capital costs 
required might vary widely between landholders. 
 
The problem caused by the capital cost component was that it would not be realistic to 
landholders to leave it out, but including it within the bid offers meant that it would be 
confounded with the production opportunity costs.  This was addressed by asking 
respondents to nominate for each choice option selected the amount of waters and 
additional fencing required to implement the option.  In the subsequent analysis, 
estimates of value for the capital cost components can thus be made and subtracted from 
the WTP amounts1. 
 
 
2.4  Sampling 
Initially it was intended to collect information on both grazing and cropping enterprises to 
determine how the associated costs of the two may vary.  However, this would have 
increased the complexity of the information presented to respondents, and it was decided 
to focus on cattle graziers, some of whom would have some cropping in their enterprise. 
                                                 
1 A simple subtraction to give a net WTP amount may have raised experimental design problems, so it may 
have been better to introduce a new variable representing estimated capital costs. 
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Two separate areas were selected for comparison; one that had been targeted with 
devolved grants and one that had not.  The purpose of this was to test whether familiarity 
with being paid to protect environmental areas helped to predispose respondents to 
supplying further areas of their property for this purpose.  It was unlikely that landholders 
would have set aside all of their riparian areas under a devolved grants scheme.  The CM 
survey would have targeted areas that would have involved an opportunity cost to 
landholders as well as capital costs. 
 
 
3.  The Choice Modelling survey  
The CM scenario was framed in the context of landholders being paid for the provision of 
ecosystem services, and the following information was provided at the beginning of the 
survey. 
 
We are interested in showing the State and Commonwealth governments that it is 
possible to negotiate with individual landholders to improve environmental conditions.  
We want to show that it will be more cost-effective for the government to focus in specific 
areas, and that it would be possible to negotiate varying levels of environmental 
improvement on a voluntary basis. 
 
We are suggesting a system where landholders could enter into contracts with a regional 
natural resource management body or government.  In this system, landholders would 
receive annual payments to change their management practices for environmental 
outcomes, so that they are no worse off. 
 
T o demonstrate that there would be different amounts of interest and money required 
between landholders, we are focusing on what landholders think about managing 
vegetation buffer strips in their river frontage areas. 
 
The reason for focusing on vegetation along major waterways is to protect biodiversity 
and to reduce the amount of sediment entering major waterways.  Sediment has 
potentially large impacts on the Great Barrier Reef area, but because there are many 
sources, it is difficult to impose any controls or regulation.  We want to show that a 
system of incentives or voluntary contracts may be a better way of changing landholder 
actions. 
 
We are interested in the amount of payment you would need to manage your river 
frontage areas more conservatively. 
 
In a CM valuation exercise, the choice scenario is described in terms of different 
attributes. There are a range of attributes that are important components of riparian 
management and it was important that environmental outcomes (water quality 
improvements) could be achieved.  Consequently, certain biophysical conditions or 
attributes were set as baseline conditions for any management options that attracted a 
rebate. These were outlined in the survey as follows: 
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The main requirements for the condition of this river frontage area is that: 
(a) it should be a minimum of 50 metres from the top of the main bank 
(b) it should be spelled for 40% of the year (can be spelled at several different 
times to make up the 40%), and 
(c) there should be a minimum of 2000 kg/ha of grass biomass left by the end of 
the dry season (see photos on page 4 for examples). 
 
Establishing these baseline conditions meant that other aspects of landholders preferences 
for incentive payments could then be explored in the choice sets.  Four attributes were 
used to describe the choice scenario, two of which were 6 level attributes and two were 3 
level attributes (Table 2). 
 
Table 2.  Attribute key used in survey questionnaire and levels applied  
 
Payment received 
($/km/year) 
This represents the payment you would receive to meet the 
other option conditions. 
 Attribute levels $100, $200, $300, $750, $1500, $2500* 
 
% of your river 
frontage covered  
This refers to the length of river covered by an agreement.  
The management conditions outlined above will apply. 
 Attribute levels 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% 
 
Length of 
agreement 
This is the length of time that any agreement will last.  
 Attribute levels 5 years; 10 years; perpetual 
 
Who you deal 
with 
This refers to the type of organisation that will be the 
managing authority for any agreement. You will be given a 
choice between state and local governments and a 
registered community group.  
 Attribute levels State and local governments and community group 
*  An explanation of how the price levels were determined are outlined in Rolfe et al. 2004c 
 
 
In a CM survey, respondents are presented with a series of choices or choice sets. In this 
survey there were six choice sets to complete.  Each choice set had four options and 
respondents were required to select one option.  The first option, which remained the 
same in each choice set, was the status quo or “do nothing” option.  It was defined as 
their current management practices.  Three other options were available, each described 
in terms of the same four attributes, but the levels varied in each option.  The four option 
layout was chosen because it helped to minimize violations in modeling requirements2, 
                                                 
2  These are the IIA/IID conditions, which require that model parameters are proportionally unaffected if 
one of the alternatives is dropped from the analysis. 
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but came at a cost of making choice sets more complicated for respondents.  An example 
choice set is provided in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1  Example choice set  
Question 17a: Carefully consider each of the following options. Suppose these were the ONLY 
ones available, which would you choose? 
 
Remember: The main requirements for the condition of this river frontage area is that: 
(a) should be a minimum of 50 metres from the top of the main bank 
(b) should be spelled for 40% of the year (can be spelled at several different times to make up 
the 40%), and  
(c) there should be a minimum of 2000 kg/ha grass biomass left by the end of the dry season 
(see photos for examples)  
Payment 
received 
$/km/year 
% of your river 
frontage 
covered 
Length of 
agreement Who you deal with I would choose 
     
Option A     
$0 Current None None    
Option B     
$300 10% 5 years Local government    
Option C     
$300 20% 5 years Community group    
Option D     
$750 10% 10 years Local government    
 
 
The experimental design3 allowed for both main effects and first order interactions 
between the attributes to be estimated, and had an efficiency level of approximately 82%.  
There were six choice sets in each survey and six versions of the survey which meant that 
36 different choice sets were completed in the survey.   
 
Usually in a CM survey, respondents are simply asked to indicate their selection of a 
particular option in each choice set.  However, in this study, once an option had been 
selected in the choice set, additional information was gathered on the fencing and water 
requirements associated with the option selected.  This information was gathered so that 
the operating costs associated with the management option could be separated from the 
capital costs of providing extra fencing and water points. 
 
In order to ensure the choice sets were clear and comprehensible icons were used and 
particular attention was paid to the layout.  Colour was used to identify the status quo 
                                                 
3  The experimental design was provided by Associate Professor Deborah Street from the University of 
Technology, Sydney. 
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option as compared to the choice sets, as well as to highlight that additional questions on 
fencing and water requirements needed to be completed for each choice set. 
 
 
3.1  Survey collection details  
One of the main concerns in survey collection is the response rate, particularly when 
landholders are the targeted participants. 
 
There are four main factors that are likely to affect the response rate: 
 the topic of the survey, 
 how well the survey has been publicized, 
 how difficult the survey is to complete, and  
 how much effort is put into the survey distribution and collection. 
 
A recent survey of sugarcane growers in central Queensland (with whom a low 
participation rate would be expected) achieved a response rate of 67% (Windle and Rolfe 
2005).  Although the survey was well tested at focus groups, it could not be considered 
easy to complete and included a relatively complicated Choice Modelling exercise with 
labeled choice sets.  However, the topic of enterprise diversification was very relevant to 
canegrowers, which may have contributed to high participation rates.  The survey 
collection technique involved an initial telephone call to establish landholders’ 
willingness to participate in the survey which was well publicized and had industry 
support.  The survey was then delivered directly to the respondent and collected from 
them at a prearranged time.  This meant that respondents did not have to go to the effort 
of mailing the survey back, and knowing that someone was coming back to collect the 
survey meant that they that it was not so easy for them to ignore the survey or think it was 
too difficult to complete.  The extra effort put into the collection had dividends in a 
higher response rates. 
 
The vast size of the Fitzroy Basin, (143,000 sq kms) made the costs of applying the drop-
off/pick-up collection technique prohibitive and a modified three-stage format was 
adopted. Two prior phone calls were made and then surveys were mailed out with a reply 
paid return envelope.  
 
There was no list of contacts for graziers in the region and the first step was to try and 
identify possible participants.  Two areas were targeted in the basin and all people listed 
with Telstra as “graziers” were contacted by phone and asked if they would be interested 
in completing a survey about paying graziers for improved management of river frontage 
areas.  If agreeable they were informed that a follow-up phone call would be made and 
further information provided. 
 
Of the 298 listed numbers, 157 (74%) were agreeable and 54 refused.  Forty six could not 
be contacted and 41 were unqualified. 
 
The second stage required identifying the exact property location of the potential 
participants on a database with exact information about the rivers/creeks and their river 
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order.  Some properties might have more than one watercourse on the property, and 
names of rivers might vary.  It was important that the respondent was clear about exactly 
which river or creek they were providing information about in the survey.  In addition, for 
the survey information to be effective from an analytical perspective, it was important 
that the river order was known, because the costs associated with riparian management 
would vary according to river order.  The information of the name of the creek and river 
order were agreed between the enumerator and the landholder over the phone and 
recorded on the survey before it was sent out.  There were some difficulties in matching 
the properties from the first round calls with the database. In addition, not everyone had a 
creek or river of sufficient size as only river orders three and above were targeted.   
 
The third stage was to mail out the surveys with a reply paid envelope for return. Only 60 
graziers had been identified from the initial list and they were sent a survey in late 2004.  
A response rate of 33% was achieved with 20 surveys returned.  
 
 
4.  Survey results 
The socio-economic characteristics of respondents are presented in Table 3.  Generally, 
respondents were well experienced, and ran a family enterprise.  While 75% did employ 
labour, the average was only two people (with part time labour counted as 0.5).  Only 
35% had some form of off-farm income, and for 71% of these, the proportion was less 
than 25% of household income.  65% had some level of debt, of which 62% had levels of 
less than 25% of the total asset value.   
 
Table 3.  Socio-economic characteristics of respondents 
Respondent characteristics   
% male respondents 85% 
Average age  53 years (range 36-67) 
Average experience  34 years (range 10-60) 
% with post year 12 education  45% 
Average farm enterprise income (gross)  $250,000 - $500,000 
% with dependent children  40% 
Median number of family members working the 
property 
2 (range 1-5) 
% employing labour  75%   
% with some off farm income  35% 
% with some debt  65% 
Property characteristics  
% freehold ownership  65% 
Median property size (ha)  4378 ( range 1110 - 137,500) 
Median head of cattle  1110 (range 350 - 11,000) 
Average stocking rate per ha  0.26 (range 0.08 - 0.51) 
% cattle only enterprise  50% 
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Characteristics of the grazing enterprises are also presented in Table 2. The properties 
were relatively large, ranging from 1110 ha to 137,500 ha and average stocking rates 
were relatively low (0.26) which would be expected for the region. Half of the properties 
were cattle only enterprises and the other half had some cropping, but generally cropping 
comprised less than 15% of the property area.   
 
The majority of respondents had a positive attitude to the profitability of their farm 
enterprise.  90% thought they were currently profitable and 75% thought they would be 
profitable in five years time.  There was less optimism about property values, with 55% 
believing that values would increase in the next five years, while 45% thought they would 
stay much the same.  Nobody thought they would decrease.  
 
Respondents were mixed in their opinions about how they thought improving the 
condition of the natural environment on their property would affect the property value.  
As many thought it would decrease the value as thought it would increase, but half did 
not know, or thought it would have no effect.  While there was not a strong perception 
that increasing the environment values would translate into an increase in property 
values, there was a perception that they were managing their properties in an 
environmentally responsible manner.  Most respondents (75%) believed they balanced 
production and environmental benefits in their property management decisions.   
 
The focus of attention in the survey was on maintaining a minimum grass biomass in 
riparian areas.  A 2000kg/ha biomass was the baseline condition required (see Section 3), 
which was set at an above “duty of care” level.  Respondents were asked what percentage 
of their river frontage area they estimated would have this biomass at the end of the dry 
season.  The median percentage in a normal year was 90%; ranging from 10% to 100%. 
35% believed they maintained this level of biomass 100% of the time.  The median for 
the last couple of (drought) years was 60%, and ranged from 0% to 100%. 
 
There was a range of river orders represented in the survey sample, with half being an 
order 4 or 6.  The river order 6, the largest in the Fitzroy Basin, was the Dawson River.  
Half the properties already had all or part of their river frontage area already fenced and 
25% had already received a grant to help with fencing costs.  Apart from two properties; 
one with 80 kms and one with 25kms of waterway within their property, the average 
length was 6.4 kms or 5.6 kms that was not already fenced.  The average width of river 
that would could be fenced off and managed separately was for most respondents under 
250 metres (50% with 100 metres or less and 40% with 101-250 metres).   
 
 
4.1  Choice Modelling results 
The main result of the CM exercises was that there were too few surveys collected and 
too few choice sets completed for the choice data to be analysed.  Seventy five per cent of 
respondents chose the status quo option and did not complete a choice set.  Furthermore, 
out of a possible 120 choice sets (six pages of choices and 20 surveys) 87% selected the 
status quo option.   
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The strong preference for the status quo could have been because respondents were not 
interested in the incentive payments or because they found the choice sets too difficult.  
Both options were explored further in the survey. 
 
Anecdotal evidence would suggest that there is considerable resentment towards the 
government by graziers in central Queensland over new tree clearing legislation.  The 
Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 ensures broad scale 
tree clearing of remnant vegetation is phased out by 2006.  An earlier moratorium and 
disputes over the classification of some areas as remnant vegetation as opposed to 
regrowth has generated much anger in the region over a number of years.  Many graziers 
with freehold leases are concerned about the erosion of their private property rights and 
are suspicious of government initiatives.  Some of the respondents may have viewed 
riparian buffers as another issue where landholder property rights could be eroded further. 
 
In the survey, before being asked to complete the choice sets, respondents were asked if 
they were interested in being paid by the government to provide environmental benefits 
(eg making a buffer strip along their waterway).  There was a mixture of responses, and 
broadly, 45% were not interested; 35% were interested and 20% were unsure. 30% 
specifically identified themselves as “not interested in dealing with the government”. 
 
However, it would appear that it is not distrust for the government that primarily 
motivated landholders to opt for the status quo or “no change” option.  After the choice 
sets had been completed, a follow-up question probed the reasons behind those who 
always selected the status quo option.  Respondents were asked to select from the 
following options: 
 I already manage my property in an environmentally responsible way. I do not 
need to be paid extra for this. 
 I think it is wrong to pay people to manage their property in an environmentally 
responsible way. 
 I do not trust the government to agree to such an arrangement. 
 I do not trust that I would receive any rebate. 
 The payments offered were not attractive enough. 
 Some other reason (please specify). 
 
Eighty five percent of relevant respondents selected the first option “I already manage my 
property in an environmentally responsible way. I do not need to be paid extra for this.” 
and only two selected the third option “I do not trust the government to agree to such an 
arrangement”.  
 
The extent to which the difficulty of the survey may have led to the strong support for the 
status quo option was also explored.  Half the respondents agreed that they “understood 
the information in the questionnaire” and 25% were neutral.  Although 40% agree that 
they “needed more information than was provided”, 35% were neutral.  However, 60% 
agreed (half of which strongly agreed) that they found answering the choice sets 
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“confusing”.  This may be partly because the issue may not have been previously 
considered by respondents, making it difficult for them to analyse the choices. 
 
There are always tradeoffs in a Choice Modelling survey between providing more 
information and putting respondents off with too much information.  The results outlined 
above suggest that although more information could have been provided, it was presented 
in an understandable format.  However, the choice sets were obviously confusing and this 
may well have influenced respondent selection and possibly the survey response rate. 
 
One further issue was explored after the choice sets had been completed and that was 
attitudes to the type of management agreement and whether respondents had a preference 
for contracts or covenants.  The highest proportion (44%) would prefer a contract, but 
covenants were selected by 19%, with 38% being uncertain.   
 
 
5.  Discussion and summary 
Designing market-like mechanisms to provide environmental services poses particular 
design issues for economists and policy makers.  While there is substantial theoretical 
and case study evidence that such mechanisms are effective, there are a number of key 
issues to address in a design process.  In a typical case study, property rights need to be 
set and allocated, and auction design, metric design, and contract design issues addressed.  
At an individual case study level, there is often very limited information available to 
guide these design processes.  However, the cost of a poor design can be very substantial 
in terms of creating other inefficiencies and market failure problems.  
 
Many economists have been addressing these design needs with theoretical tools, various 
forms of experimental economics, and case study analyses.  While the latter approaches 
may be powerful, they can be expensive and cumbersome, and in many cases, may not be 
addressing exactly the problem at hand.  Drawbacks of using case studies to predict 
future market behaviour are that most case studies are focused on different circumstances 
and are ex poste in nature.  This means that substantial assumptions need to be applied to 
extrapolate case study results to designing market-like mechanisms. 
 
Experimental economic techniques have the potential to address these deficiencies by 
designing for the situations of theoretical interest and using relevant information (Roth 
2002). The difficulties with experimental economic techniques are that they are limited in 
the number of variables that can be included in a single analysis, tend to be cumbersome 
and expensive to perform, and students (rather than specific stakeholders) are often used 
as participants.  These issues mean that there is potential for other tools such as non-
market valuation techniques to be applied for the purposes of predicting market 
behaviour and designing market based instruments (MBIs).  The relative merits of state 
preference valuation over revealed preference techniques are discussed in Rolfe et al. 
(2004c). 
 
For the first time, CM has been applied together information about landholders’ attitudes 
and ex ante behaviour if a competitive tender incentive mechanism was introduced in the 
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region.  However, the response rate was lower than anticipated and insufficient data was 
collected to run a statistical model. There are two primary reasons for the low response 
rate. First, the population from which the survey sample was selected was too limited, 
providing a very real constraint to the application of CM in such a situation.   
 
There were several factors that affected the size of the sample population.  
 There was no contact list of graziers in the region. 
 Once contact was made, many landholders did not qualify, mainly because there 
was not a river of sufficient size on their property. 
 The need to establish the exact river area (and river order) of interest on a 
database and agree this with a potential respondent further limited the sample 
size. 
 
Although a larger sample size could have been gathered had there been better contact 
information, in general, careful consideration needs to be given to the use of CM where 
the sample population is limited.  The implication is that the CM technique may not be 
appropriate for modeling many discrete case study situations where sample sizes may be 
limited. 
 
The second major constraint was that the survey instrument proved difficult and 
confusing to complete.  While the information requirements meant the survey was more 
complicated than a standard non market environmental valuation, there are some design 
issues that could have been improved.   
 
First, there were some basic rules of survey design that were not given sufficient 
consideration.  It is usual practice to begin a questionnaire with some simple warm-up 
questions to make the respondent feel that the questions will not be too difficult.  In this 
survey, the first questions gathered information about the kilometres of waterway under 
respondent control (distinguishing between normal boundary, give and take boundary, 
and within property river frontage areas), the area already fenced and whether they had 
received a devolved grant.  Although these questions were not difficult, they did confuse 
some people, which was not an ideal way to begin the survey.  The other basic rule that 
could have been given more consideration is the use of focus groups to test the survey 
design.   One focus group was held in the early stages of survey development, but had the 
final design been tested at another focus group, it is likely that the survey would have 
been identified as too confusing and adjustments could have been made. 
 
Second, there were measurement issues that confounded the presentation of information 
in the choice sets.  Usually the information presented in a choice set relates only to the 
choice profiles – ie, the different options available.  In this survey two addition sections 
of information were provided in the choice set.  There was a reminder about the baseline 
conditions that applied, and after the choice options, if a respondent had selected a rebate 
option, further information was collected on their capital costs.   
 
There was one further issue that may have influenced respondents.  The experimental 
design was based on pair wise comparisons and this did not suit the use of qualitative 
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variables.  In each choice set, there were three “rebate” options apart from the status quo 
option and in each of the three rebate options, two attribute levels were the same and one 
was different.  As a consequence, the difference between the profiles was limited, which 
may have made it harder for respondents to make choices.  This was an unexpected 
consequence of moving from a two-profile to a three-profile design.  The problem would 
not have been as marked had the attribute levels all been defined in quantitative terms.  
However, the “Who do I deal with” attribute had qualitative levels (local government, 
state government and community group).  This meant that if a respondent had a specific 
aversion to one of these choices, eg community group, the use of pair wise comparisons 
meant that it was possible that two of the options could have automatically been 
excluded, leaving the respondent with only one remaining option.  The “length of 
agreement” attribute also included one qualitative level (5 years, 10 years and perpetual) 
and any respondent that found a perpetual agreement unacceptable could also have their 
options limited. This is not a fault of the experimental design itself, which was developed 
before the attribute levels had been determined and before consideration was given to the 
use of qualitative levels.  
 
Third, given that the survey was relatively complicated, a pick-up collection technique 
should have been applied that would have increased the response rate, although it would 
have also increased the survey costs. 
 
In summary, while the survey results did not provide sufficient data to run a statistical 
model they did provide an indication that if a competitive tender for riparian services was 
held in central Queensland, it could be anticipated that there would be low participation 
rates.  Many cattle graziers believe that they already manage their properties in an 
environmentally responsible way.  This confirms the results of an earlier (1999) survey of 
graziers in central Queensland which reported a 60-80% adoption of selected sustainable 
industry management practices and a perception within the industry that best practice is 
currently widely in use ( Taylor et al. 2000). 
 
The use of Choice Modelling has potential to provide a broader range of information to 
assist in the design of market-based incentives.  However, applying CM in this context is 
more complex that the more common environmental value applications and careful 
attention should be paid to survey methodology and design.  Use of the method is limited 
in circumstances where case studies are complex and where there is a narrowly defined 
survey population.  Further research is needed to explore how non-market valuation 
techniques can be adapted to predict market behaviour in these cases. 
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